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ABSTRACT 
The established definition of replication in terms of the conditions of causality, similarity and 
information transfer is very broad. We draw inspiration from the literature on self-reproducing 
automata to strengthen the notion of information transfer in replication processes. To the 
triple conditions of causality, similarity and information transfer, we add a fourth condition 
that defines a “generative replicator” as a conditional generative mechanism, which can turn 
input signals from an environment into developmental instructions. Generative replication 
must have the potential to enhance complexity, which in turn requires that developmental 
instructions are part of the information that is transmitted in replication. Demonstrating the 
usefulness of the generative replicator concept in the social domain, we identify social 
generative replicators that satisfy all of the four proposed conditions. 
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Information, Complexity and Generative Replication 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen 
1. Introduction 
Considerable recent progress has been made in refining the abstract definitions of the core 
Darwinian concepts of variation, inheritance and selection.1 This work is guided by the insight 
that Darwinian principles do not apply to biological organisms alone, but to the evolution of a 
broad class of phenomena, including technologies and social institutions.2 If Darwinian 
principles have a general application to complex systems involving populations of varied and 
causally interacting entities, then we are obliged to specify these principles clearly in abstract 
terms, so they can serve as constructive principles for theory development across specific 
empirical domains.  
This essay focuses on inheritance and replication. Since it was coined by Richard Dawkins 
(1976), the replicator concept has been clarified (Hull, 1988; Sterelny et al., 1996; Godfrey-
Smith, 2000a; Sperber, 2000; Aunger, 2002; Nanay, 2002). However, efforts in this direction 
are complicated by the famous “evo-devo” dispute concerning the relative roles of 
development, selection and genotypic transmission (Baguñà and Garcia-Fernàndez, 2003; 
Gilbert et al., 1996; Stadler et al., 2001; Wimsatt, 1999). Recent formulations of 
“developmental systems theory” try to generalize Darwinian principles in very broad terms 
that sideline or exclude the replicator (Griesemer, 1994, 1999; Griffiths and Gray, 1994, 1997; 
Wimsatt, 1999).3 
Theorists emphasizing the developmental side of the evolutionary process point out that 
inherited information itself cannot provide a complete description of the emerging phenotype 
and consequently development depends crucially on the particular context. Heredity and 
development interact in a way that cannot give overwhelming priority to the genotype. James 
Griesemer (1994) thus roots the concept of inheritance in whole developmental lineages, 
rather than in genotype-to-genotype transmission. 
Paul Griffiths and Russell Gray (1997, p. 473) explain that developmental systems theory 
“takes to its logical conclusion the slow unraveling of the idea that genes are the sole 
evolutionary replicators.” In particular, some biologists have “drawn attention to the large 
class of structures which are inherited parallel with the genes and play an essential role in 
development at the cellular level. … These intra cellular elements of the developmental 
matrix are essential for the replication of DNA and are not themselves constructed on the 
basis of DNA sequences.” As Eva Jablonka and Eörs Szathmáry (1995) argue, these parallel 
structures constitute an additional “epigenetic inheritance system”. Hence developmental 
                                                 
1 The authors are very grateful to Marion Blute, David Hull, Pavel Luksha, Peter Richerson, Kim Sterelny, 
Viktor Vanberg, anonymous referees and several others for comments and discussions. 
2 See Dawkins (1983), Hull (1988), Dennett (1995), Hodgson (2004, 2005) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a). 
3 Wimsatt (1999) rejects the replicator-interactor distinction but retains the genotype-phenotype concepts. This is 
inconsistent if we accept the former distinction as a generalization of the latter (Brandon, 1996). 
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systems theory shifts the focus onto the entire “developmental system” rather than the 
replicator and its “vehicle” (Dawkins, 1976) or “interactor” (Hull, 1988). While issues 
surrounding development are important, they do not, in our view, overturn the core Darwinian 
principles of variation, selection and inheritance.  
Can sociocultural evolution be explained in terms of generalized Darwinian principles? 
Darwin (1859, 1871) himself considered the evolution of language and ethics. Other social 
scientists developed the idea more than a century ago (Bagehot, 1872; Ritchie, 1896; Veblen, 
1899; Keller, 1915). The idea was revived thanks to Donald T. Campbell (1965) and others. 
Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson (1985), and William Durham (1991) have considered 
culture as an inheritance mechanism. However, this recent literature largely bypasses the 
question of the detailed mechanisms of cultural replication or transmission (Wimsatt, 1999). 
There is some ambivalence whether “memes” are genotypes or phenotypes, replicators or 
interactors (Blackmore, 1999).  
Our aim is to explore in more detail the social and psychological mechanisms of 
sociocultural evolution, and where possible place these in a generalized Darwinian 
framework. Once we examine the transmission mechanisms involved, then we are presented 
with multiple possible substrates, from brain patterns to symbols and artefacts. Nothing in 
social culture remotely corresponds to the DNA code. As Stephen Jay Gould (1996) and 
William Wimsatt (1999) elaborate, there are further radical dissimilarities. For example, in the 
sociocultural domain there are complex patterns of inheritance and few clear boundaries 
between species. For Gould these are reasons to reject the idea of communalities between 
biological and sociocultural evolution. For Wimsatt they mean that evolutionary concepts 
have to be pushed to a high level of generality, after abandoning the distinction between 
replicators and interactors. 
In contrast, we propose that the distinction between replicator and interactor can be retained 
in the sociocultural domain. Part of our rationale for this devolves from the understanding that 
Darwinian evolution is essentially about interacting and replicating populations of (varied and 
developing) entities rather than singular “self organizing” or “developing” systems. Once this 
focus on populations is established, then we need to understand the sources of both similarity 
and variation between elements, and to place this in the context of both the development of 
individual entities and the evolution of entire populations. We regard the replicator and 
interactor concepts as essential to this task. As Robert Brandon (1996, p. 125) argues, the 
distinction between replicators and interactors “is best seen as a generalization of the 
traditional genotype-phenotype distinction”. Without the replicator and interactor, the 
distinction between genotype and phenotype similarly dissolves. 
Although the possibility of multiple levels of selection has long been mooted by biologists 
and is well established in the philosophy of biology (Brandon, 1996; Keller, 1999; Michod, 
1999; Sober and Wilson, 1998), it is sometimes sidestepped in discussions of replicators and 
interactors. It is especially pertinent in this context because what might emerge as an 
interactor at one level might conceivably act as a replicator at another (higher) level. For 
instance, some prominent accounts view human individuals as biological interactors and their 
genotypes as biological replicators. The admission of an additional and cultural level of 
transmission leads Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Durham (1991) to treat individual ideas or 
preferences as copied or transmitted in that “higher” domain. It is only one further step to 
consider social groups, structures or institutions as plausible interactors (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Henrich, 2004; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004b). If this is a valid move, then the (human 
individual) interactors at the biological level become the repositories of replicator-like 
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features (dispositions or preferences) at the sociocultural level. The question of multiple levels 
of selection has to be moved higher up the agenda. 
Failure to do this might exacerbate the problems identified by Kim Sterelny et al. (1996); 
they argue that developmental systems theory lacks adequate definition of the boundaries of 
the units in the evolving population. We propose that some such boundaries must exist in an 
evolutionary system that is capable of retaining relatively successful adaptations and 
generating increasing complexity. 
A second feature of our strategy is to make a link with the literature in mathematics and 
computer science on self-reproducing automata (Neumann, 1966; Sipper, 1998; Freitas and 
Merkle, 2004). John von Neumann‟s theory of self-reproducing automata has had little impact 
on the discourse on replication in the philosophy of biology. Yet it provides theoretical 
illumination and offers an additional context in which any generalized Darwinian theory must 
fit. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section two we scrutinize the widely 
used definition of replication in terms of the triple conditions of causality, similarity and 
information transfer. Section three draws from the literature on self-reproducing automata to 
strengthen the notion of information transfer in replication processes. Essentially, generative 
replication requires that developmental instructions are part of the information that is 
transmitted in replication.  
Section four establishes the concept of generative replication. In addition to the triple 
conditions of causality, similarity and information transfer, we adopt a new condition that 
defines a generative replicator as a conditional generative mechanism, a material entity that 
embodies mechanisms that can turn input signals from an environment into developmental 
instructions. By this definition, genes but not prions are generative replicators. Section five 
examines the conjecture that generative replication has the potential to enhance complexity. 
Section six demonstrates the usefulness of the concept of generative replication in the social 
domain by identifying habits as social replicators that satisfy all four conditions. Section 
seven concludes the paper. 
2. Replicators and Replication 
Dawkins (1976) described replicators as having longevity, fecundity and fidelity. Dawkins 
(1982, 2004) also defined replication as involving genotypic copying fidelity sufficient to 
limit copying error and to pass on to successive generations the genotypic errors and 
mutations that actually occur. He identified both genes and “memes” as replicators, but the 
term “meme” was so broad that it encompasses ideas, practices, writings, paintings, artefacts, 
pop tunes and social institutions. There is ongoing controversy on what a meme is, and little 
progress in identifying the equivalent to the “genetics” of memetic replication. David Hull 
(1988, p. 408) defines a replicator as “an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in 
successive replications.” A key question here is what structures are significant and why. 
Sterelny et al. (1996, p. 395) offer a more elaborate definition of a replicator. They propose 
that if B is a copy of A, and B is produced through a process of replication, then “A plays a 
causal role in the production of B” and “B carries information about A in virtue of being 
relevantly similar to A. This similarity is often functional: B has the same, or similar, 
functional capacities to A”. Their definition emphasizes the three key points of causal 
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implication, similarity and information transfer, which are central to most subsequent 
definitions. 
These three elements, taken together, admit a very wide class of entities. Against Dawkins 
and others, Sterelny et al. argue that non-organisms such as bird nests and animal burrows 
qualify as replicators. But the causal role that one nest or burrow plays in the production of 
another is highly limited. If nests and burrows are to be admitted as replicators, then their 
causality condition has to be interpreted in very weak terms. The causal link is merely that 
each replicator is a practice model for its successors. Arguably the causality condition has to 
be coupled with other stipulations that make it less loose and more meaningful. Our definition 
below of “generative replicators” excludes nests, burrows, and many human artefacts. 
In another development of the replicator concept, Peter Godfrey-Smith (2000a, p. 405) 
emphasizes that replication involves “two main elements, a resemblance between copy and 
copied, and some suitable causal relation linking the copy to the copied.” Like Dan Sperber 
(2000), he is notably sceptical of versions of cultural evolution based on the meme. 
Dan Sperber (2000, p. 169) argues that replication involves three elements of causation, 
similarity, and information transfer.4 He refines the information transfer condition as follows: 
“The process that generates B must obtain the information that makes B similar to A from A. 
… B must inherit from A the properties that make it relevantly similar to A.” He argues that 
many cases of so-called memetic replication are not true replication, principally because his 
information transfer condition is violated.  
A problem is that the three conditions of causality, similarity and information transfer cover 
a broad class of copying processes. They would also apply to technologies such as 
photocopying, and the copying of data on magnetic media or on compact disks. The similarity 
condition pertains. The causality condition is also satisfied because the original is causally 
implicated in the production of the copy, in the weak sense that without the original the copy 
could not exist. For Sperber (2000) the “information transfer” condition is also satisfied 
because the “information” in the copy originates from the original. 
Although these criteria cover a broad range of copying processes, Sperber points to 
exceptions, such as the example of contagious laughter spreading through a group. Although 
one person‟s laughter may trigger the laughter of another, the laughter itself is “not copied” 
because the second person does not imitate the laughter of the first. Instead “there is a 
biological disposition to laughter that gets activated and fine tuned through encounters with 
the laughter of others. … The motor program for laughing was already fully present in him, 
and what the laughter of others does is just activate it” (Sperber, 2000, p. 168). He thus claims 
that his information transfer condition is unsatisfied in this case. 
If instead a second sound recorder were switched on to record the sounds of a first recorder, 
then for Sperber this would be a case of true replication satisfying all three of his conditions. 
Similar remarks seem to apply to the photocopying of documents. However, while these 
examples are different from the contagious spread of laughter, the difference seems mainly of 
degree. The triggering of patterns of laughter may involve a signal that is much simpler than 
the detailed information copied by sound recorder or photocopier, but the difference lies in the 
                                                 
4 Aunger (2002) refines Sperber‟s (2000) definition by adding a fourth condition of “duplication”, meaning that 
replication of one entity gives rise to two or more. We are unconvinced that Aunger‟s fourth condition of 
“duplication” is necessary or useful. The critical issue in understanding the process of replication is the nature 
and function of the structure that is passed on, including any information that it might hold.  
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amount and the kind of information transferred. In no case is the transferred information 
sufficient itself to produce the copy. In none of these cases is the copying mechanism itself 
copied. 
What if the intensity and style of the initial laughter triggers mirth of a similar intensity and 
style in others? Then the initial laughter would be carrying information that was critical in 
forming the character of the copied laughter. Sperber himself admits the possibility of 
laughter being “fine tuned” through encounters with others. In which case the initial laughter 
becomes more than a mere trigger: it carries significant information that is copied. 
Furthermore, Sperber‟s condition that “B must inherit from A the properties that make it 
relevantly similar to A” can be interpreted in terms that exclude not only his example of 
laughter, but also the examples of copying with sound recorders or photocopiers. It all 
depends what we mean by “properties”. In his discussion of laughter, Sperber focuses on the 
capacity to produce the behaviour. The disposition to laugh is not replicated, but neither is the 
capacity to make copies with a sound recorder or photocopier. These machines already have 
the capacity to make copies. Hence, if these “properties” include the capacity to produce a 
copy, as well as the information in the copy, then none of these examples satisfy his 
information transfer condition, because some of these key properties are not inherited in the 
copying process. 
Although Sperber‟s information transfer condition takes us in the right direction, it is 
insufficiently precise. It depends crucially on what is meant by “information” and what 
properties have to be inherited to constitute true replication. A critical issue pertains to the 
replication of a copying mechanism, or the absence of such processes. Relevant insights 
appear in our discussion of self-reproducing automata in the next section. 
3. Inspiration from Self-Reproducing Automata 
John von Neumann (1966) considered conditions under which automata would be capable of 
producing copies of themselves, and capable of generating novelty and additional complexity. 
He did not propose that evolution always increases complexity, but he was interested in the 
conditions under which further complexity could be generated. Von Neumann (1966, p. 80) 
distinguished between the copy of entities that synthesized to produce higher degrees of 
complexity, and the copying of entities that reduced overall complexity: 
There is thus this completely decisive property of complexity, that there exists a critical 
size below which the process of synthesis is degenerative, but above which the 
phenomenon of synthesis, if properly arranged, can become explosive, in other words, 
where synthesis of automata can proceed in such a manner that each automaton will 
produce other automata which are more complex and of higher potentialities than itself. 
Following von Neumann, we propose that generative replication should be confined to cases 
with the potential to increase complexity. This would exclude copying with sound recorders 
or photocopiers, or of nests and burrows. Such copies have no more potential to enhance 
complexity than their predecessors. For increasing potential complexity, copies must 
eventually be capable of producing novel additional components, or performing novel 
operations in response to new environmental conditions and input signals. 
Von Neumann (1966) examined in detail the properties that a self-reproducing automaton 
must possess to make it capable of producing other automata. These properties include 
instructions that describe the structure and processes of an automaton, a copying unit that is 
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capable of reading and copying instructions into a new automaton and translating them as 
directions for a production unit, a production unit that builds a new automaton, and some 
mechanism of coordination between these elements. His research has influenced robotics and 
computer science (Sipper, 1998; Luksha, 2003). 
However, biological replicators lack the abstract properties of self-reproducing automata 
outlined by von Neumann. In particular, as developmental systems theorists emphasize, genes 
themselves do not carry enough “information” to describe or generate a new organism. The 
development of the organism depends additionally not only on environmental stimuli, but also 
on cellular structures inherited alongside the genes. Consequently, neither genes nor 
organisms constitute a complete “production unit” for new organisms. 
The theory of self-reproducing automata points to the potential to enhance complexity. It 
also sees the developmental instructions as part of the information that is transmitted on 
replication. These two inspirations lead us to the concept of generative replication. A 
generative replicator is a material entity that is responsive to environmental stimuli or signals. 
There is at least one signal that can cause a non-degenerative response from the replicator. 
Such a response consists of further instructions or signals to the interactor, which guide its 
development. It is non-degenerative in the sense that it leads to outcomes that are conducive 
to the survival of the replicator and the information it carries. 
For example, the DNA “code” determines the constitution of the protein molecules in the 
organism. It instructs the processes of cell-formation by governing the production of amino 
acids and proteins, subject to the circumstances and external conditions involved. 
4. The Generative Replicator Defined 
We acknowledge Dawkins‟s point about copying fidelity and passing on mutations, but it is 
insufficient for our project. Our concern here is to define a special class of replicators that 
have the potential to increase complexity, rather than to define the broader boundaries of 
replication itself. Furthermore, Dawkins (2004, p. 391) associates copying fidelity with 
mutations or errors in genotypic information and by contrast requires that most 
„environmentally acquired changes‟ are not passed on. But this important distinction begs the 
definition of a genotype or replicator. 
On the basis of our discussion of self-reproducing automata, we adopt an additional fourth 
proposition in the definition of a generative replicator: 
4. Conditional generative mechanisms: Generative replicators are material entities that 
embody construction mechanisms (or “programs”) that can be energized by input 
signals, containing information about a particular environment. These mechanisms 
generate further instructions from the generative replicator to the interactor, to guide 
its development. (External influences that produce outcomes generally unfavourable to 
the survival of the replicator or interactor are not described as input signals but as 
destructive forces.) 
This first proposition adds to the established three definitional features for a replicator, 
namely causal implication, similarity and information transfer. We refine these as follows: 
1. Causal implication: The source must be causally involved in the production of the 
copy, at least in the sense that without the source the particular copy would not be 
created. 
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2. Similarity: The replicated copy must also possess the capacity to replicate. The 
conditional generative mechanisms in the copy must be similar to those in the source. 
Errors or mutations in these mechanisms must also be copied with some degree of 
fidelity. 
3. Information transfer: The process that generates the copy must obtain the 
conditional generative mechanisms that make the copy similar to its source from that 
same source. 
Note how the causality condition is clarified. The enhanced similarity condition requires that 
similarity must apply to the conditional generative mechanisms and takes on board Dawkins‟s 
(2004) stipulation. A related refinement appears in the information transfer condition. These 
conditions preserve the spirit of Hull‟s (1988, p. 408) definition of a replicator as “an entity 
that passes on its structure”. An entity that satisfies all these four conditions is described as a 
generative replicator.  
One of the problems in defining the replicator concept is understanding what exactly 
“information” means. Our specification helps to fill this gap. The concept of information here 
does not necessarily carry interpretations or meanings in the same way as the information 
communicated by humans. It is information in a cruder sense of a code or signal, as stored and 
manipulated by computers and present in the DNA. For Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver 
(1949) a message has “information content” when its receipt causes some action. For us, the 
“information” involved consists of signals with the potential to trigger generative mechanisms 
that guide the production of further replicators or the development of interactors.  
Hence “information” in our definition is not ideas, which necessarily involve meanings and 
interpretations. Our added condition insists on the materiality of the replicator, hence ideas as 
such are not replicators. More appropriately, ideas may be regarded as emergent expressions 
of mental habits or dispositions. By contrast, habits qualify as generative replicators, as shown 
below. 
Our concept of “conditional generative mechanism” is close to what Ernst Mayr (1974, 
1988) describes as a “program”. Mayr (1988, p. 48) regards a program as something 
embodied in a material substrate that gives rise to goal-driven (or “telenomic”) behaviour, and 
hence is “consistent with a causal explanation”. 
Nests, burrows and photocopies are not generative replicators. None of these entities is 
capable of receiving and emitting signals that lead to the development of the interactor. 
However, given that their survival is dependent on specific environmental conditions, then 
changes in those conditions can lead to changes in their state. They can be destroyed by (say) 
water or fire. To exclude such destructive influences, the sentence in parenthesis in condition 
(4) above establishes that destructive or degenerative environmental influences do not count 
as signals. Having made this exclusion, nests, burrows and photocopies have no conditional 
mechanisms to guide the development of the interactor.  
Dawkins rejects the selfish nest and similar examples on the grounds that they fail to meet 
the similarity condition - small copying errors in nest and burrow production are not 
preserved and transmitted to a third generation. Such preservation is essential for cumulative 
evolution via natural selection, and cumulative evolution is essential for the evolution of 
complex adapted structure. For Dawkins, replication in conjunction with the right kind of 
fidelity is the necessary foundation of complexity.  
Our analysis complements that of Dawkins, who characterizes the output conditions of 
inheritance mechanisms if complex systems are to evolve. In contrast, we consider the 
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mechanisms that are required to generate complex outputs. We exclude nests and burrows 
because they do not contain a mechanism that can receive and emit signals that lead to the 
further development of the interactor. Hence they cannot compress, transmit and express 
information required in building structures of increasing complexity; they exhibit limited 
heredity in the sense of Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995). We identify generative 
replication as a necessary condition for the evolution of structures which are potentially 
unbounded in complexity. The emergence of unlimited heredity requires generative 
replication.  
Briefly consider some further examples. Widely regarded as replicators, prion proteins are 
associated with transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (such as BSE). They involve the 
accumulation of an abnormally folded variant of the normal prion protein, which spreads by 
direct contact when the normal form also becomes misfolded and thus converted to an 
abnormal and equally infectious form (Prusiner, 1998). The replication of the abnormal form 
first grows exponentially and then dies out when the pool of normal prion molecules is 
exhausted. Prion replication does not contain signal-responsive construction mechanisms that 
hold information about a particular environment. At most, it is a simple form of replication 
where no conditional generative mechanisms are passed on. Hence prions are not generative 
replicators. 
Biological viruses are infectious organisms with a nucleic acid genome (DNA or RNA). 
They spread by genome replication rather than direct contact. The genome of a virus involves 
a signal-responsive construction mechanism. A newborn genome codes for the protein coat 
(capsid) within which it is then housed. Thus, viruses are interactors (the protein coat) that 
house a replicator (the genome). Biological viruses hold information about special 
environments and acquire adaptive solutions to particular problems (such as immune 
response). Their hosts are not their interactors, and even if biological viruses are destructive 
for their hosts, they qualify as generative replicators. 
Computer viruses also contain signal-responsive construction mechanisms. Computer 
viruses also hold information about special environments (e.g. particular types of operating 
systems) and some even acquire adaptive solutions to particular problems (e.g. to avoid 
detection). Computer viruses are replicators, and their interactors are arguably the computer 
programs they infect.5 This contrasts with biological viruses, whose hosts do not constitute 
their interactors. Consequently, because computer viruses are generally destructive for the 
programs they infect, they are not generative replicators.6  
5. Generative Replication and Complexity 
For two centuries it has been debated whether evolution generally gives rise to increased 
complexity (Adami, 2002; Adami et al., 2000; Gould, 1977; Saunders and Ho, 1976, 1981). 
Some endorse the proposition, some suggest the evidence is inconclusive, and others reject 
the idea.  
                                                 
5 Note Hull‟s (1988, p. 408) definition of an interactor as “an entity that directly interacts as a cohesive whole 
with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential.” See Hodgson and 
Knudsen (2004b) for a refinement of this definition. 
6 Even so-called benign computer viruses can be mildly destructive for the computer systems they infect, by 
taking up computer memory, causing erratic performance or triggering system crashes.  
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The disagreement also concerns what definitions and measures of complexity to use when 
such claims are assessed (Adami, 2002; Adami et al., 2000). Christoph Adami‟s (2002) useful 
review of definitions and measures of complexity concluded that many have drawbacks. 
Consistent with mathematical information theory, Adami upholds that the essence of 
complexity for an evolving entity is the amount of information that it stores about the 
environment in which it evolves. Adami (2002, p. 1087) writes: 
The physical complexity of a sequence refers to the amount of information that is stored 
in that sequence about a particular environment. For a genome, this environment is the 
one in which it replicates and in which its host lives, a concept roughly equivalent to 
what we call a niche. Information … is always about something. Consequently, a 
sequence may embody information about one environment (niche) while being 
essentially random with respect to another. This makes the measure relative, or 
conditional on the environment, and it is precisely this feature that brings a number of 
important observations that are incompatible with a universal increase in complexity in 
line with a law of increasing physical complexity.  
This definition conceptualizes complexity as information relative, and conditional on the 
environment in which the entity evolves. Information is obtained from input signals that are 
actually recorded in a sequence stored in a replicator (genome), which in turn requires a 
distinction between replicators and interactors. These aspects of complexity are captured by 
our proposition that a conditional generative mechanism is a defining feature of a generative 
replicator in the sense that it is a material entity embodying mechanisms that can be energized 
by input signals.  
We adopt here the conventional concept of information from mathematical information 
theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Complexity corresponds to the amount of information 
that a replicator stores about a particular environment. The stored information relates the state 
of a replicator sequence to the actual state of the environment. A replicator sequence whose 
state perfectly corresponds to the state of the environment has maximal information about the 
environment in question.  
Complexity is measured as (neg)entropy. If the entropy of a replicator population increases, 
then it contains less information about an environment. As explained below, we measure 
complexity as the difference between the theoretical maximum amount of information about 
an environment and the actual entropy (disorder) present in the relevant replicator population. 
As this difference increases, the replicator population exhibits less disorder and more 
complexity and contains more useful information about the environment. By contrast, if there 
is a diminishing difference between the maximum amount of information and actual entropy 
(of replicators), then a replicator population looses track of the environment and exhibits less 
physical complexity.  
Before defining complexity formally, we briefly consider how our appeal to information 
relates to the recent controversy about information concepts in biology (Godfrey-Smith, 
2000b; Griffiths, 2001; Maynard Smith, 2000a, 2000b; Sarkar, 2000; Sterelny, 2000). 
Griffiths (2001) suggests a distinction between causal and intentional information. Our use of 
the information concept belongs squarely to the causal category. However, some find that it 
does not go far enough to characterize the nature and function of the gene, because causal 
information concepts apply equally to genetic and environmental factors. Thus Maynard 
Smith appealed to a stronger symbolic or intentional concept of information to characterize 
the way genes embody evolved properties that are expressed in particular phenotypical 
features.  
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We do not intend here to contribute to this controversy and our argument does not depend 
on its outcome. Rather, we use an information concept that is widely accepted and commonly 
used across a number of scientific disciplines. This implies that information and complexity, 
as defined here, applies equally to genetic and non-genetic factors; accordingly the “parity 
thesis” from mathematical information theory applies.  
We do not suggest that genes or replicators are special because they contain a particular 
kind of information. Instead we suggest that replicators differ on whether or not they contain a 
generative mechanism. Generative replicators have the capacity to increase complexity. Like 
other generative replicators, genes have this special quality.  
Our more detailed definition of the complexity of a replicator population largely follows 
Adami‟s (2002) exposition. Consider a specific environment E and the features required of a 
notional generative replicator to maximize interactor fitness in this environment, captured by 
a binary string of length L (the number of binary bits used to describe the generative 
replicator).7 The theoretical entropy value of these notional fitness maximizers, Hmax, is 
simply the sequence length L. Population level complexity is the difference between Hmax and 
the entropy of the actual population of generative replicators operating within this 
environment, also described in terms of binary strings of length L. 
To determine the entropy of the actual population of generative replicators, each bit is 
addressed in turn. For the population as a whole, the actual frequency of the (binary) fitness-
maximizing value at locus i is pi (where 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1). The entropy of a population of generative 
replicators X is denoted by H(X). The measure of physical complexity C of a population of 
replicating entities is the information that the generative replicator sequences X contain about 
the environment E: 
C = Hmax – H(X) = L + Σpi log pi       (1) 
Our definition of generative replication is based in part on the conjecture that the capacity 
to increase complexity depends critically on the existence and replication of a conditional 
generative mechanism. We illustrate this by considering three types of error.8 Namely, there is 
reading error (concerning input signals), developmental error (concerning the development of 
interactor traits from the generative replicator) and copying error (from a generative replicator 
to its offspring). A weaker surmise is that copying errors among a population of generative 
replicators are generally more destructive to complexity than reading and developmental 
errors. A stronger proposition is that the capacity to increase complexity depends critically 
and especially on generative replication with low copying errors. We offer some arguments 
below in favour of the weaker surmise, and we refer to some simulation work that we have 
done that illustrates the stronger proposition. 
Consider a process of repeated replication with input signals, the development of interactors 
and the copying of generative replicators, as in figure 1. We assume that there is no alteration 
of stored information in any individual generative replicator, implying no Lamarckian 
inheritance. In a fixed environment, these generative replicators develop traits clustered 
around a peak in a fixed fitness landscape. (Changing environments and variable or “dancing” 
                                                 
7 We use a binary string as a useful simplification for expositional reasons.  
8 Prior research on self-replicating automata (Molofsky, 1994; Wolfram, 1984, 2002) has typically excluded 
such errors. 
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fitness landscapes are excluded for simplicity, not because they would undermine our 
argument.)  
Both reading errors and developmental errors have a similar type of effect: they cause the 
population to disperse from its original position in the fitness landscape. However, if copying 
errors are zero, and the probabilities of reading and developmental errors remain constant, 
then the trend of overall dispersion will not increase through time as repeated replication 
occurs. The effects of reading and developmental errors are not cumulative. Information 
content is preserved through the faithful copying of the generative replicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Generative replication with Input Signals and Interactors 
 
Re-start the process but assume that the probability of a copying error is positive. The 
population of generative replicators is again clustered around a peak in a fixed fitness 
landscape. If a generative replicator is close to the fitness peak, then copying error is likely to 
move it away from that peak. There will be no reliable mechanism to tie it to its previous 
position. A process of drift will occur and the overall dispersion in the population will 
increase. Hence the effects of copying error are cumulative. The entropy H(X) of the 
replicator population will increase and overall complexity will decline as a result.9 
This demonstration that copying error is especially destructive to complexity illustrates the 
special importance of two of our features of a generative replicator, concerning the existence 
and relatively faithful copying of a conditional generative mechanism. It is this mechanism 
that has the potential to generate structures which are potentially unbounded in complexity (a 
critical condition in Dawkins‟s analysis). We acknowledge that the above argument depends 
                                                 
9 Note that, if it did exist, “Lamarckian” inheritance could have similarly negative cumulative effect. 
Lamarckism upholds that the acquired characteristics of the interactor may affect the replicator, leading to the 
inheritance of these acquired characteristics. In biology, Lamarckian inheritance is widely ruled out because of 
the Weismann barrier. Although social evolution is widely described as Lamarckian, this idea is contested 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006b). 
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on restrictive assumptions. Nevertheless it underlines the importance of copying fidelity and 
the cumulatively destructive effect on complexity of copying error. 
We admit that destructive forces, which reduce the chances of survival of some generative 
replicators, can undermine complexity in a population. The occurrence of disasters or 
extinctions may reverse any trend towards greater complexity. Our argument is based on the 
potential to increase complexity, and not necessarily its empirical manifestation through time. 
Furthermore, there are additional sources of complexity other than replication. 
To substantiate the proposition that the capacity to increase complexity depends critically 
on generative replication with low copying errors, we conducted a number of simulation 
experiments (Hodgson and Knudsen, unpublished). We used the classical one dimensional 
linear automaton, specified by binary values in a line of cells. At each time step, there is 
replication of a rule (an information sequence comprising the replicator) and a subsequent 
process of development where the generative replicator is energized by input signals. The 
outcome of the development process is a new individual entity whose trait value depends on 
the way the generative replicator reads and codes input signals.  
We found that even low levels of copying error can thwart the enhancement of complexity, 
and this is undermined still further as the level of copying error is increased. However, 
selection pressure can diminish the destructive effects of copying error. Uppermost, we 
showed that only if replicators comply adequately with all four of our definitional conditions, 
then complexity will increase towards some maximal level. Adami et al. (2002) reach a result 
that is consistent with this conclusion.10  
Our argument that generative replication furthers complexity has striking similarities to that 
of Ridley (2000). Ridley‟s premise is similar to ours that deleterious mutation must be kept 
within bounds if evolution is to occur. If the average rate of deleterious mutations is too high, 
then deleterious mutations will cumulate and quickly swamp the descendant populations.  
Like us, Ridley sees a tension between the evolution of complexity and the encoding of 
information. The evolution of complexity necessarily involves encoding more information 
about an environment. This requires a larger replicator sequence (L in equation 1). However, a 
longer replicator sequence will also more likely hit the critical threshold of one deleterious 
mutation per copy. The evolution of complexity requires that copying error is kept below a 
critical threshold.  
Ridley focuses on mechanisms that minimize copying error. He convincingly explains how 
meiosis diminishes the probability that deleterious mutations will swamp a population. By 
independent assortment and recombination, deleterious mutations are spread thin, so selection 
maintains a basis for ridding the population of such mutations.  
Ridley‟s argument translates into the proposition that the maximal level of complexity is 
determined by the length L (equation 1) of a replicator sequence and that the length L is 
determined by the level of copying error. The evolution of mechanisms that decrease copying 
errors in generative replication will therefore enable the evolution of complexity. Known 
examples include a storage medium that does not degrade its content (e.g. DNA over RNA), 
dilution of deleterious mutations through randomized combinatorics (meiosis), error checking 
and DNA repair, as well as sexual mating. When such mechanisms evolve, the limit of 
complexity to be achieved in a population of generative replicators will increase.  
                                                 
10 We used sequences of length 100, but additional simulations show that our results are robust for much longer 
sequences. 
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6. Habits as Social Generative Replicators 
Attempts to extend Darwinian principles to social or cultural evolution are as old as 
Darwinism itself. However, detailed discussions of the units and mechanisms of social or 
cultural replication are rare. It is important to make progress on this front if Darwinian 
theories of social or cultural replication are to develop further. 
We have proposed that habits are elemental social replicators in the social world (Hodgson, 
2003; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004a, 2004b). A habit is a disposition to engage in previously 
adopted or acquired behaviour; triggered by an appropriate stimulus. Habits are formed 
through repetition of behaviour or thought. They are influenced by prior activity and are the 
basis of both reflective and nonreflective behaviour. Crucially, we may have habits that lie 
unused for a long time. Habits are submerged repertoires of potential behaviour that can be 
triggered by an appropriate stimulus or context. 
Habits sometimes give rise to observable behaviour and are sometimes confined to 
unobservable thoughts. Although all habits involve thoughts or mental activity, for simplicity 
we refer to the former as “habits of behaviour” and the latter as “habits of thought”. Unlike 
DNA or computer viruses, habits of behaviour do not directly make copies of themselves. 
Instead they replicate indirectly, by means of their behavioural expressions. They can impel 
behaviour that is consciously or unconsciously followed by others, as a result of incentive or 
imitation. Eventually, the copied behaviour becomes rooted in the habits of the follower, thus 
transmitting from individual to individual an imperfect copy of each habit. 
The replication of observable habits of behaviour satisfies all the four criteria for generative 
replication. Both the original habit and its copy embody a conditional generative mechanism. 
The acquired habit is both energized conditionally on the receipt of environmental signals and 
plays a constructive role in the development of the interactor, i.e. the individual with the habit. 
Furthermore, the habit of behaviour in one person causes behaviour that is copied, at least in 
the sense that the copy depends on the source, and leads to similar habits being acquired. The 
acquired habit of behaviour is similar to the first with respect to the behaviour it might 
promote under specific conditions. Tacit or other information is transferred in the process.11 
Habit-forming behaviour can be moulded by incentives or constraints. In many cases, such 
as language or some traffic conventions, we can have powerful incentives to behave like 
others. In doing so, we too build up habits associated with these behaviours. The behaviours 
are reproduced and the habits giving rise to them are replicated. 
Habit replication also often relies on imitation, which need not be fully conscious and may 
involve some “tacit learning” (Polanyi, 1967; Reber, 1993; Knudsen, 2002a). Imitation can 
result from an instinctive propensity, which has itself evolved for efficacious reasons among 
social creatures (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Simon, 1990; Tomasello, 1999). If imitation is 
more than mimicry, then the rules and understandings associated with it also have to be 
transmitted. 
By contrast, habits of thought are unobservable and cannot emerge through behavioural 
imitation. They consist of mental models that enable conscious deliberation and manipulation 
of situations. Actors adapt and use their mental models as guides as they proceed through a 
particular cultural context (Johnson-Laird, 1981). As habits, mental models are formed by 
                                                 
11 Similarity in neural connection design, even with similar genes and environment, is very unlikely (Edelman, 
1989). Underlying neuronal configurations supporting similar habits are likely to differ between individuals. 
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repetition of particular associations and patterns of thought. Under specific conditions, when 
agents experience common external constraints or regularities, they may develop similar 
mental models that will direct conscious deliberation towards a particular object in a 
particular class of situations. Different people that face similar environmental regularities will 
experience similar mental models that may be caused by different patterns of neuronal activity 
(Kurthen, 2001). Hence similarities in habits of thought and mental models can emerge when 
enduring similarities in external constraints or conventions exist. 
Members of a species are similar regarding their physical construction, sensory organs, 
nervous system and brain function. These similarities provide common constraints that may 
promote some similarity in mental experiences of the external world; similarities in physical 
construction become causes as well as evolutionary consequences of similarities in 
experience. The possibility arises that two human beings will experience similar mental 
phenomena when confronted with the same external object (Edelman, 1989; Kubovy and 
Epstein, 2001).  
Cultural circumstances and social institutions vary from society to society, but members of 
each society have to adapt to them. An evolutionary explanation of the replication of habits of 
thought or other mental phenomena requires and explanation of the evolution of the social 
institutions that provide common conventions or constraints. Common conventions or 
constraints are a necessary but insufficient requirement for the replication of habits of thought 
to take place.  
However, if two agents in the same context independently produce similar mental models, 
then no replication has taken place because no mental model is causally implicated in the 
emergence of the other. Replication of mental models would require that one agent could 
somehow access the mental model of another. This raises the question of how crucial 
information in the replication process is communicated. 
Language becomes paramount. In psychology and neuroscience, the acquisition of 
language initially establishes a triadic correspondences of mental models, objects and 
behaviours that become mental models common to the members of a society (Karmiloff and 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2001; Tomasello, 1999). The learning of a language involves the 
development of an elaborate correspondence between mental phenomena and properties of the 
physical and social world. 
Through a shared language, a person can access the mental model of another. This 
transmission of mental models is improved by close interaction with error-correction. By 
gestures and questions, agents establish joint attention that increases the accuracy of 
transmission of mental models and establishes mutual understandings. Language is a vital link 
in this causal chain: the replication of habits of thought depends on language. 
Habits of thought satisfy all four of our conditions for a generative replicator. They 
constitute conditional generative mechanisms that are essential to a generative replicator. 
They are energized conditionally on the receipt of external signals and play a role in the 
development of the individual. Given the existence of a shared common language as well as 
common extralinguistic points of reference, the habit of thought in one person causes a mental 
model that is transmitted and can lead to a similar habit of thought being acquired. The 
acquired habit of thought is similar to the first with respect to the mental model it might 
promote under specific conditions. Some kind of information regarding a perceived property 
of the world is transferred in the process.  
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Genes themselves depend on the biochemical substrate of an organism. Similarly, habits 
cannot exist apart from the human organisms in which they reside. They are formed and 
stored in the individual human nervous system. But habits differ from genes in their 
mechanism of replication, and habits do not have anything like the potential durability and 
copying fidelity of the gene. In social evolution, additional mechanisms weed out or alter 
aberrant habits. Mechanisms of social conformity are particularly important (Henrich and 
Boyd, 2001). 
Having established (observable and unobservable) habits as elemental generative 
replicators in the social world, we have the building blocks to understand other social 
generative replicators. These include customs and routines (in the technical sense of the term 
employed by evolutionary economists such as Nelson and Winter, 1982). These social 
generative replicators involve structured assemblies of habituated individuals. Behavioural 
cues by some trigger specific habits in others. Hence various individual habits sustain each 
other in an interlocking structure of reciprocating individual behaviours. But we have not got 
the space to go into the details here. 
7. Conclusions 
Inspired by the work of von Neumann on self-reproducing automata, we have established the 
concept of a materially-grounded conditional generative mechanism (or program) and argued 
that it plays a key role in the generative replication process. This mechanism is an essential 
part of the “information” that is stored in the generative replicator and copied through 
replication. It also informs and guides the development of the interactor. 
Following von Neumann, we associate generative replication with the potential to increase 
complexity, given other vital factors, without assuming that evolution necessarily embodies 
such a trend. We are not saying that generative complexity always leads to greater 
complexity, or that complexity results from replication alone. We argue that copying error is 
generally more destructive to complexity than other forms of error, particularly in 
environmental interactions or individual development. With protein synthesis, the work of 
Lee et al. (2006) supports this conclusion by identifying a catastrophic loss of accuracy 
associated with accumulation of error. 
The conditional generative mechanism appears in a four-clause definition of the generative 
replicator. Genes clearly qualify as generative replicators. Other suggestions, including bird 
nests, burrows, and photocopiers do not qualify because they lack a conditional generative 
mechanism, and their replication does not have the potential to increase complexity. Hence 
our definition has important discriminating powers and identifies an important subclass of 
replicators. However, we acknowledge that many processes in evolution do not rely on 
generative replication. 
One might wish to go further and disregard all non-generative replicators as true 
replicators. We do not pursue this issue here. The degree of viable extension of the replicator 
concept, and the distinction between replication and contagion or diffusion, are issues that 
require further discussion (Sterelny et al., 1996; Szathmáry, 2000). Like Dawkins we 
emphasize genotypic copying fidelity, but we associate it with the special class of generative 
replication, rather than replication per se. Furthermore, our generative replicators are a subset 
of Dawkins‟s replicators, because our definition also requires material entities that embody 
developmental mechanisms (programs) that can be energized by input signals. Entities that 
replicate such developmental mechanisms can compress, transmit and express the information 
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required in building structures of increasing complexity. Generative replication is therefore a 
necessary condition for heredity of structures which are potentially unbounded in complexity. 
Accordingly, the emergence of unlimited heredity requires generative replication.  
Dawkins characterizes the conditions on the outputs of inheritance mechanisms for 
complexity to evolve, involving a potentially unlimited stock of distinct replicators in 
conjunction with the right kind of fidelity. In contrast, we consider the mechanisms that are 
required to generate one of those outputs, namely complexity.  
Turning to sociocultural evolution, our refined definition has important implications. As 
widely acknowledged, the literature on memes suffers from vagueness and ambiguity. If 
memes are simply ideas, then our materiality condition rules them out as replicators. Instead, 
we regard ideas as emergent expressions of habits that in turn qualify as generative 
replicators. This overcomes the dualism and separation of the ideal and material worlds, by 
grounding ideas upon habits, as in pragmatist philosophy (Joas, 1993; Diggins, 1994; Putnam, 
1995; Hodgson, 2004). We suggest that customs and (organizational) routines also qualify as 
generative replicators. Consideration of their mechanisms of replication would address the 
detailed equivalent of the “genetics” of social replicators that has been missing from 
discussions of memes. 
We have underlined the importance of copying fidelity in information transmission from 
one generative replicator to another. Upon this the preservation and potential enhancement of 
complexity depends. A case can be made in the biological world that the Weismann barrier – 
limiting any interference by the interactor with the information in the generative replicator – 
has evolved to deal with this problem (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995). A big question 
is whether there is an equivalent Weismann barrier in the social domain. Genetic or culturally 
transmitted mechanisms of conformism may be important in sustaining such a barrier. This is 
among several research questions prompted by our definition of a generative replicator. 
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